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1. Introduction 
With respect to constitutional fundamental rights review by the judiciary, the 
Netherlands has always been a bit of a stranger in Europe. Comparatists usually 
describe the way judicial review of statutes in Europe is shaped as rather different 
from the American system, where the Supreme Court has basically empowered 
itself to review the constitutionality of statutory laws.1 The authority to strike down 
legislation in the New World is therefore exercised by the judiciary at large and it is 
the highest appellate court that ultimately decides upon the matter.2 By contrast, the 
European tradition is closely connected to the existence of ‘Kelsenian’ constitutional 
courts specialized in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes and executive 
action.3 Such courts notably exist in for instance Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain and 
Belgium, but also in the relatively younger liberal democracies like Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Constitutional courts almost by definition engage in a critical 
dialogue with the national legislature. When Hans Kelsen famously described 
constitutional courts as ‘negative legislators’, he was referring to their power to 
annul acts of the legislature.4  
It is at this point that the Dutch differ from most of their European neighbours. 
Their legal system does not involve concentrated review by a specialized 
constitutional court. This is largely because judicial review of primary legislation is 
traditionally prohibited pursuant to Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution. It is clear 
from the outset that this ban on judicial review reduces the need for a specialized 
court. One would be mistaken, however, to conclude that there is no such thing as 
judicial fundamental rights review in the Netherlands. Quite the contrary, Dutch 
courts usually subject executive action and occasionally Acts of Parliament to 
rigorous fundamental rights review in a way that Mark Tushnet would probably 
describe as ‘strong judicial review’.5 This kind of review is dispersed in the sense 
 
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2 Tushnet 2006, p. 1242-1244. 
3 See e.g. Von Beyme 1988, p. 24-25. 
4 Kelsen 1945, p. 268-269. 
5 See Tushnet 2008. 
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that it is carried out by any court in the country. They do so on the basis of another 
provision in the Dutch Constitution, Article 94. It contains the duty to set aside any 
kind of regulation – be it statutory or not – if the application of these regulations 
conflicts with provisions of treaty law that ‘bind all persons’, which means that they 
have direct effect or contain – as one might say – judicially manageable standards.6 
Statutes can therefore be reviewed by the judiciary for their consistency with 
written provisions of international law. The gradual growth of human rights treaty 
systems such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and, even more notably, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) has resulted in an increasingly self-conscious 
attitude of the courts towards parliamentary legislation. This is strengthened by the 
fact that the Dutch courts are moreover obliged to ensure the effective application of 
European Union law – that also contains fundamental rights – in the domestic legal 
order as a matter of EU law itself.7 They must therefore carefully examine whether 
national law is compatible with the law of the European Union and, if necessary, 
either construe national law consistently with EU law or set it aside if such an 
interpretation proves impossible under national constitutional law.8 
In this contribution we will describe the way the Dutch courts have – in a 
sometimes rigorous, sometimes cautious and sometimes downright activist way – 
engaged in rights review of parliamentary legislation. As we will note, the case law 
of the highest courts shows a tendency to assume a positive lawmaking role in a 
limited number of cases. Yet, simultaneously the courts have gradually adopted a 
cautious doctrine to draw a line between, what they consider to be, acceptable and 
illegitimate judicial lawmaking. Although, as we have observed, it is not a 
constitutional court, our account will focus on a specific court, called the Hoge Raad 
(literally: ‘High Council’). It is usually referred to as the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands. As the highest court in civil, criminal and taxation cases, it ultimately 
rules on the lawfulness and interpretation of statutory law in a majority of cases. 
However the Court has a very limited jurisdiction over the administrative courts. 
This particular field of law has its own highest courts (most notably the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State) carrying out a similar 
lawmaking role.9 For the sake of clarity, we will generally limit our account here to 
the case law of the Supreme Court. The highest administrative courts usually follow 
 
6 On ‘judicially manageable standards’, see Fallon 2006, p. 1274-1332. 
7 European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments of 5 February 1963, Case 26/62 (Van Gend & Loos); 
15 July 1964, Case 6/64 (Costa v. E.N.E.L.). 
8 This duty for national courts is consistently underlined by the ECJ, for example in the Colson 
& Kamann case (ECJ 10 April 1984, C-14/83, Jur. 1984, p. 1891). For further reading, see: Craig 
& de Búrca 2008, p. 305-376; Claes 2006; Arnull, Dashwood, Ross & Wyatt 2000, p. 60-83; Van 
Gerven 2000, p. 501-536. 
9 The others being the Central Appeals Court (Centrale Raad van Beroep) and the Industrial 
Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven). For a brief account of the Dutch 
judicial organization, see Kraan 2004, p. 635. 
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a comparable approach and use similar terminology when it comes to their 
constitutional position with regard to judicial lawmaking.10 
Before starting our account of the lawmaking role of the courts in civil liberties 
adjudication, we will touch upon the way in which fundamental rights are 
protected in the Dutch domestic legal order by virtue of international law. This 
subject will be more extensively discussed by our colleague Evert Alkema in his 
national report with regard to the incorporation of public international law in the 
Dutch legal order.11 Before we do, it is noteworthy to underline that the position of 
national courts within the structure of European Union law is very different from 
their position under the European Convention on Human Rights and the other 
human rights treaties. We will touch only briefly on the subject of EU law and focus 
mainly on the human rights treaties. After discussing the international law 
framework, we will proceed with a discussion of the leading cases with regard to 
the lawmaking powers of the courts. To that end, we will analyse some of the more 
activist judgments of the Supreme Court in which it has tried to judicially reform 
legislation on the basis of international fundamental rights review. We will also 
attempt to offer some flavour of the dialogue in which the Court has sometimes 
tried to manipulate or guide the legislature in a certain direction. From that 
perspective we will moreover deal briefly with some of the reactions offered by 
legal scholarship. We will then cover some of the more procedural aspects of the 
lawmaking role of the courts, such as the means and effects of judicial review of 
legislation. This entails a brief account of the current legal actions open to 
individuals challenging the validity of statutes and the specific injunctions the 
courts are allowed – or expressly not allowed – to issue in such cases. We will end 
this contribution by summarizing very briefly the different issues we encountered, 
thereby dealing explicitly with the questions posed by the general reporter. 
2. The Ban on Judicial Constitutionality Review and its Scope 
2.1. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution 
As a convenient starting point for a debate on rights review in the Netherlands 
might serve the fact that the Netherlands does have a written constitutional 
document, which – like in Germany – is literally called the Basic Law (‘Grondwet’), 
but which is usually translated as the ‘Constitution’. It is a relatively sober 
document, outlining the system of government. The first chapter is devoted to civil 
 
10 See, for instance, two relatively recent judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division 
of the Council of State on suffrage: ABRvS 29 October 2003, JB 2004/3 (Suffrage for mentally 
handicapped); ABRvS 21 November 2006, JB 2004/308 (Eman & Sevinger). An interesting 
example of the administrative courts engaging in positive legislating provides their case law 
on the reasonable time requirements in judicial decisions. Departing from the clear text of the 
statute in question, it formulated clear rules on the basis of Art. 13 of the European 
Convention. See ABRvS 4 June 2008, AB 2008/229. Moreover see (in Dutch): De Poorter & 
Van Roosmalen 2009, p. 219-227. 
11 To be published in the IACL series. 
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liberties and social rights. Chapter six includes some provisions on the 
administration of justice. As we have already mentioned, the traditional cornerstone 
concerning the constitutional position of the courts in the Netherlands is Article 120 
of the Constitution, which reads: 
‘The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the 
courts’.12 
The message this provision contains is threefold. First and foremost, there is to be 
no judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes.13 This means that there is no 
role for the courts to play when it comes to deciding either whether a certain 
statutory provision is in breach with the Constitution or whether the legislative 
process followed the correct procedural rules.14 Such matters are to be left to the 
legislature, which in the Netherlands is composed of both the government (i.e. the 
Queen and the Cabinet) and the First and Second Chambers of the parliament, or 
the ‘States General’ as it is properly called.15 We will henceforth use the terms 
Parliament and legislature interchangeably. 
The term ‘constitutionality’ in Article 120 is to be interpreted broadly. The 
courts assume that they are not only banned from determining the 
unconstitutionality of statutes, but equally from declaring them incompatible with 
the Kingdom Charter16 or general principles of law.17 They might occasionally 
refuse to apply a certain statute by reference to the fact that such an application 
violates a legal principle.18 However, they can do so only where there are 
exceptional circumstances which the legislature did not expressly consider at the 
 
12 As derived from the jointly published translation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the 
Interior (2002). A copy of this translation can be found at <www.minbzk.nl/english>. There 
is currently a bill pending in Parliament to amend Art. 120. This ‘Halsema proposal’ aims at 
allowing the courts to review statutes for their consistency with most of the civil liberties 
mentioned in the Constitution. See Heringa & Kiiver 2009, p. 165. 
13 When using the term ‘statutes’, we refer to primary legislation, enacted by the national 
legislature, which − according to Art. 81 of the Constitution − is composed of Parliament and 
the government. 
14 Supreme Court judgment of 27 January 1961 (Van den Bergh). The courts consider themselves 
banned from interfering in the legislative process on the basis of procedural constitutional 
requirements as well. See Supreme Court judgment of 19 November 1999, NJ 2000/160 (City 
of Tegelen v. Province of Limburg). 
15 Cf. Art. 81 of the Constitution. For further research, see Heringa & Kiiver 2009, p. 103-107, 
supra note 13. 
16 The Kingdom of the Netherlands is more or less structured in a way between a federation 
and a confederation of states (the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba). They are 
united by the Crown and a constitution for the federation called the Charter for the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, or the Kingdom Charter (Statuut). It is relatively concise, however, 
compared to the constitutions of the three member states. Unquestionably, the Charter takes 
precedence over the national constitutions but in reality those constitutions are far more 
relevant in practice. Charter review is therefore something quite rare. 
17 Supreme Court judgment of 14 April 1989, NJ 1989/469 (Harmonisation Act).  
18 See, for instance, the Supreme Court judgment of 9 June 1989, AB 1989/412 (Short-term 
volunteers). 
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time of passing the act. In such cases the refusal to apply the law does not in itself 
affect the binding nature of the Act in question. The courts then assume that 
Parliament would most probably have wanted them to ignore the statute. This was 
for instance the case in 1989, when a group of short-term civil servants were 
promised a pension benefit which, at the end of the day, the administration was not 
prepared to award them. In the Short-term volunteers case, the government argued 
that the pensions of civil servants were carefully regulated by parliamentary 
legislation. As the Act in question had not incorporated the promise, the denial of 
the benefit was a matter of parliamentary legislation and the courts were not 
allowed to have a say on the matter.19 The Court decided differently and allowed 
the appeal. It considered that Parliament had not deliberately refused to meet its 
obligations and that the Court was thus in a position to disapply the statute in 
question. 
Even if no such situation arises, the courts are not prevented from expressing 
their views on the issue put before them. In the 1989 Harmonisation Act judgment – 
its landmark case on Article 120 – the Supreme Court maintained that it was clearly 
not entitled to review whether an Act of Parliament was compatible with legal 
principles but it made it painfully clear that – had it been allowed to do so – it 
would have ruled that the 1988 Harmonisation Act violated the principle of legal 
certainty. The court thus gave the legislature some piece of, what might properly be 
called, ‘expert advice’ and the latter, taking the hint, eventually changed the law. 
The ban on judicial review of legislation then does not prevent the judiciary to 
engage in a dialogue with the legislature, be it that such occasions remain rare.  
Second, the prohibition against primary legislation review that Article 120 
imposes on the courts is a narrow exception to the general rule that the courts are in 
fact competent to test any provision for its consistency with rules of higher law 
including general legal principles.20 Courts may therefore decide upon the 
constitutionality of ministerial decrees and administrative, provincial or municipal 
regulations. The competence to do so was already established in 1864 by the 
Supreme Court.21 A third message to be read in Article 120 of the Constitution is 
that the courts may not review written international law for its compatibility with 
the Dutch Constitution. This effectively means that in the Dutch legal order, treaties 
take precedence over any kind of national law including the constitution itself. 
Article 120 is complemented by Article 94 of the Constitution, which basically states 
that any law (including the Constitution itself) which is incompatible with 
justiciable provisions of treaties is not to be applied. Quite apart from Article 120, 
the Courts also consider themselves banned from deciding upon the 
constitutionality of European Union law. The Supreme Court has completely 
accepted the absolute supremacy of EU law over national law, emphasizing that the 
effect of EU law in the Dutch legal order is a matter of the Community rather than 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 See the Supreme Court judgment of 16 May 1986, NJ 1987/251 (The State v. The Society for 
Agricultural Aviation). 
21 Supreme Court judgment of 6 March 1864, W 2646 (Pothuys). For further reading on the 
subject, see Kortmann & Bovend’Eert 2000, p. 134-135. 
J. UZMAN, T. BARKHUYSEN & M.L. VAN EMMERIK 
 7 
the national Constitution.22 As we will see, this has great consequences for the role 
of the courts. 
2.2. Summary 
The conclusion of this brief introduction to Article 120 of the Constitution may be 
that – as a general rule – it formally bans the courts from reviewing whether Acts of 
Parliament are compatible with higher law, with the notable exception of self-
executing treaty provisions. Sometimes the courts do express their views on the 
constitutionality of primary legislation and consider themselves entitled to refrain 
from applying unconstitutional legislation on the basis that Parliament would not 
have wanted them to apply it in view of exceptional circumstances in a particular 
case. They are moreover empowered to review any other piece of legislation for its 
constitutionality and may review Acts of Parliament for their compliance with 
written provisions of international law to the extent that these provisions provide 
judicially manageable standards for review. This has practically led to a situation 
where international human rights law (most notably the ECHR) has taken over the 
role as the most important civil rights charter for the Netherlands. Judicial review – 
whether of legislation or of executive action – is primarily focused on the European 
Convention, the International Covenant and some other human rights treaties. As 
we limit our discussion here to judicial review of parliamentary legislation, we will 
from now on focus primarily on the role of the courts in reviewing on the basis of 
these treaties. We will therefore proceed with a discussion of the constitutional 
framework for the implementation of international law. 
3. Enforcing International Human Rights Law 
3.1. Introduction: Monism and Article 94 of the Constitution  
The Dutch are widely known to have a very friendly constitutional climate for 
international law. As we said before, international law takes precedence even over 
the Constitution itself. This friendly climate essentially originates from the 
traditionally rather monist approach of the Dutch legal profession. As early as 1919, 
the Supreme Court expressed its opinion that international law as such is 
automatically applicable in the domestic legal order. There is thus no need for any 
kind of conversion to norms of national law.23 Not only are treaty provisions as such 
accepted as valid law as a matter of customary law. They are also recognized to be 
of a higher order. Accordingly, the courts generally assume that unless Parliament 
expressly deviates from its international obligations, it must clearly have intended 
any provision in its Act to be consistent with a given treaty. This assumption is the 
basis for the courts’ usual practice to interpret national law as far as possible in a 
 
22 Supreme Court judgment of 2 November 2004, NJ 2005/80. 
23 Supreme Court judgment of 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371 (Treaty of Aachen). For a further 
discussion, see Zwaak 2001, p. 597-599. 
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way consistent with the rights laid down in conventions such as the ECHR. And it 
is this practice that has given rise to a few of the most celebrated but also deeply 
notorious (some might even say activist) Supreme Court judgments. On such 
occasions it may well read in the statute some highly detailed rules that have very 
little to do with either the text of the statute in question or its legislative history.24 
To turn back to the supremacy rule: should Parliament legislate expressly 
against the text and the prevailing interpretation of a treaty, the treaty irrefutably 
takes precedence over the conflicting statute. This has arguably always been the 
case but as from 1953, there has been a clear provision in the Dutch Constitution 
empowering the courts to disapply the statute in question. This provision is 
currently laid down in Article 94 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: 
‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such 
application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of 
resolutions by international institutions’. 
The key question, which is ultimately for the courts to decide upon, is what exactly 
constitutes a provision of a treaty ‘that binds all persons’. The importance of the 
answer to this question lies in the fact that the courts may not disapply the national 
statute if it ‘only’ conflicts with provisions of international law that do not fit this 
description. According to Article 93, a treaty ‘binds all persons’ when it is 
proclaimed and in so far as it contains provisions that may by their very nature be 
eligible to ‘bind all persons’. This only shifts the issue to what kind of provision 
would be ‘eligible to bind all persons’.  
3.2. ‘Eligible to bind all Persons’ and Judicial Lawmaking 
In the current case law of both the Supreme Court and the highest administrative 
courts, this requirement comes down to two questions.25 First of all, whether the 
contracting state parties have expressly agreed upon the nature of the treaty 
provision. This is seldom the case, however. The courts therefore usually convert 
the question into a matter of justiciability. Does the text of the provision provide the 
courts with judicially manageable standards to decide the case? In the words of the 
Supreme Court in its 1986 landmark judgment concerning a major railway strike: 
‘does the provision require the legislature to legislate on a certain subject or is it by 
its very nature eligible to function as “objective law” without further ado?’.26 The 
real question thus becomes whether the courts are able to derive from the provision 
some clues as to how to decide cases without having to engage in extensive judicial 
lawmaking. This brings us near the heart of our subject in this paper. Because if the 
 
24 See, for instance, the two Supreme Court judgments of 21 March 1986, NJ 1986/585 and NJ 
1986/588 (Spring judgments) on parental authority. See further the judgment of 27 May 2005, 
2005/485 (Parental authority II). We will discuss these cases at length further on.  
25 See, e.g., the Supreme Court judgment of 30 May 1986, NJ 1986/688 (Railway Strike); Judicial 
division of the Council of State, judgment of 15 September 2004, AB 2005/12. 
26 Ibid. 
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courts decide wrongly on this issue, they might end up having to decide the case by 
reading into the treaty detailed rules which the treaty itself is really unable to yield. 
And they may then be legislating rather than judging the case, which makes them 
vulnerable to charges of judicial activism. The key criterion (whether the treaty 
provision textually provides a sufficient degree of manageable standards) therefore 
theoretically serves as a preliminary question for the courts to solve in order to keep 
them away from political territory. 
What complicates matters, however, is that the decision whether a particular 
treaty provision is likely to ‘bind all persons’ is generally a ‘yes or no’ decision. 
Once the courts consider a provision to be self-executing (which we will, for the 
sake of simplicity, use interchangeably for the phrase ‘binding on all persons’), they 
consider themselves bound by such a ruling in further cases. Both the circumstances 
and the context of a specific case are therefore irrelevant when it comes to the 
question of the self-executing nature of the treaty provision. Deciding whether or 
not the provision is self-executing is pretty much like deciding whether the patient 
is pregnant. She either is or is not, but that has little to do with the circumstances. 
Yet, this may confront the courts with a dilemma. Because although the text might 
produce a clear outcome in one case, it might equally fail to do so in the next. 
Phrased differently: the text might yield some clear standards, but those standards 
might prove insufficient in a particular national context. A clear example is 
furnished by the principle of non-discrimination as laid down, for instance, in 
Articles 26 ICCPR and 14 ECHR. These provisions provide the applicant with a 
relatively clear right so it is usually equally clear for the government what it must or 
may not do. The question whether a given statute constitutes unlawful 
discrimination might sometimes pose a challenge to the courts, but usually not one 
they cannot handle by using a balancing test. The text of these provisions may 
therefore be considered self-executing. Having met this challenge, however, the 
court might then face the equally difficult task of providing a remedy for the 
violation. In some cases there might be several different outcomes of the case, each 
of which could be equally lawful.  
Suppose that the court holds that the exclusion of a certain group of people 
from a tax exemption is unjustified. Because it is clear what the government should 
not have done – exclude people from a benefit granted to others – the treaty 
provisions give the courts relatively clear guidance as to whether there is a 
violation. They are therefore ‘binding on all persons’. However, just disapplying the 
statute would either not provide the applicants with a remedy or it would take the 
courts in political territory because it would grant a benefit to a large group of 
people where the legislature might just as lawfully have denied it to anyone. The 
principle of non-discrimination only requires after all that both groups are treated 
the same, not that they should both have the tax benefit. In such cases the ‘binding 
on all persons’ requirement itself does not prevent the courts from having to engage 
in positive lawmaking. 
This dilemma raised some discussion in legal literature on the question 
whether the decision to mark a provision as self-executing ought to be contextual 
(depending on the characteristics of a given case) or dichotomic by nature. The 
Supreme Court has never been very explicit on the subject. Several authors 
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concluded from the above-mentioned judgment in the 1986 Railway Strike case that 
as it was either the agreement between the contracting parties or the text of the 
treaty provision which was decisive, it must logically follow that the nature of the 
case in question was not a relevant factor in the decision whether the treaty was 
self-executing or not. In their view, the Supreme Court took a dichotomic 
approach.27 Others maintained quite the opposite. In a case in 1984, the Supreme 
Court had for the very first time in its history explicitly acknowledged the fact that 
it had a lawmaking role to play.28 But it pointed out that this lawmaking role would 
have been outstretched had it accepted the claim of an applicant who felt 
discriminated against and invoked the non-discrimination clause of paragraph 26 of 
the ICCPR to acquire a right to Dutch citizenship. The Court made it clear that it 
would have to choose between different outcomes, each of which were equally 
consistent with the non-discrimination requirement of Article 26. Since that would 
involve a choice the Court took to be essentially political by nature, it granted that 
the going practice of the government constituted a different treatment between men 
en women but it refused to rule on the question whether that constituted a violation 
of Article 26. Most scholars then concluded that the Court had meant to say that 
Article 26 was not self-executing in that particular case as it had otherwise refused 
judgment which the courts are not allowed to do under Article 13 of the General 
Provisions Act 1829.29 
Meanwhile, the general feeling has turned to the dichotomic view. It is 
important to note in this respect that the Supreme Court itself seems to have 
abandoned its practice of refusing to rule on the question whether there is a 
violation. It is still very reluctant to provide a remedy (other than an informal 
declaration of incompatibility) in cases where that would involve political decision-
making, but it does deal with the argument of complainants that the statute in 
question is incompatible with fundamental human rights law.30 And so it reviews 
statutory legislation on the basis of treaty law – thereby implying that the treaty is 
self-executing – even in cases were the remedy remains a political issue. The Court 
moreover confirmed its new course in its Yearly Report of 1995-1996.  
To sum up, fundamental rights review in the Netherlands primarily relies on 
international human rights documents such as the European Convention and the 
ICCPR. These treaties automatically have legal effect in the Dutch legal order. 
Courts may, on the basis of Article 94 of the Constitution, review Acts of Parliament 
for their compliance with Convention rights if the treaty is proclaimed and in so far 
as the individual provisions are self-executing. A provision either is considered self-
executing at all times or it is not. The key criterion is whether the treaty provision 
textually provides a sufficient degree of manageable standards for the courts to 
decide the case upon. The ‘binding all persons’ requirement therefore theoretically 
 
27 Fleuren 2004. 
28 Supreme Court judgment of 12 October 1984, NJ 1985/230 (Dutch citizenship). 
29 See, for instance, Brouwer 1992, p. 279. 
30 The landmark case in this respect is the Labour expenses deduction judgment in 1999. See 
Supreme Court judgment of 12 May 1999, BNB 1999/271. This judgment will reappear 
frequently in the course of this article. 
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serves as a preliminary question to be solved by the courts in order to keep them 
from having to decide between several political outcomes. However, because the 
specific constitutional characteristics of a given case do not play a role in deciding 
the issue whether or not a particular treaty provision is self-executing, the courts 
may frequently be confronted with a provision that in itself may provide some clear 
standards but which may nonetheless force the court to engage in positive 
lawmaking in certain specific situations. These days the courts are very aware of 
this dilemma and they have tried to cope with it in a careful manner. Before we turn 
to the case law of the Supreme Court and its reception by legal scholarship, let us 
first say something about the historical reception and current position of European 
human rights law in the Netherlands, as they are closely connected to the way the 
Dutch courts carry out their lawmaking role. 
3.3. The Increasing Role of the European Convention in National Case Law 
Although the Netherlands has usually lived up to its relatively monist tradition, it 
does not follow that the European Convention was always given the full weight in 
practice it ought to have had on a purely formal basis. As we have said before, with 
the introduction in 1953 of the current Article 94 of the Constitution, it became 
common ground that treaty law clearly takes precedence over any kind of 
legislation. Only a year later, on 31 August 1954, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
joined the ECHR and yet, for nearly thirty years the courts remained very reluctant 
indeed to apply the Convention, let alone disapply legislation violating it.31 Until 
the 1980s, the judiciary was so cautious that there was hardly one case where the 
Supreme Court found a violation of a Convention right.32 If a Convention right was 
involved, the Court would either try to refer to a comparable right in Dutch law or 
it would deny the self-executing nature of the Convention right. It was also 
common practice to interpret Convention (or indeed Covenant) rights in such a way 
that they had either a very narrow scope or a very broad limitation clause.33 
Conflicts between national legislation and human rights treaty law thus seemed 
very rare in the 1960s and 1970s. This led E.A. Alkema to conclude in 1980 that the 
courts had played only a very limited role in the implementation of the ECHR.34 
However, things started to change rapidly soon after Alkema reached this 
conclusion and already in 1988 the story sounded very different.35 After a 
remarkable decision of the Maastricht District Court in 1977, disapplying a 
provision of the 1935 Road Traffic Act due to it violating Article 8 of the ECHR, an 
era began in which the courts overcame their initial reluctance within a few years.36  
 
31 What might have played a role, though, was that the Convention was initially rarely invoked 
before the courts. 
32 The notable exception being a judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 April 1974, NJ 1974/272.  
33 Van Dijk 1988a, p. 640-641. 
34 Alkema 1980, p. 182-183. 
35 See Van Dijk 1988a, p. 641-649. 
36 Maastricht District Court, judgment of 14 November 1977, Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law 1978, p. 293. For further reading: Van Dijk 1988a, p. 641; Myjer 1980, p. 21-29. 
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The Supreme Court was no exception. In 1980 it ruled that Article 959 of the 
Civil Procedure Code was to be interpreted in the light of Articles 8 and 14 of the 
European Convention. The legislature had knowingly established a difference in 
procedural treatment between cases concerning the custody of legitimate and 
illegitimate children. In the latter case, it was impossible for relatives of an 
illegitimate orphan to appeal against a decision of the local magistrate withholding 
custody. The Civil Procedure Code granted a right to appeal only to legally 
recognised kin and the legislature had always explicitly taken the view that there 
was no kinship between illegitimate children and family members of the parents.37 
The Court considered the views on the justification of this different treatment of 
legitimate and illegitimate children considerably changed. This was reflected in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, notably in its 1979 Marckx 
judgment.38 This judgment thus served as an argument to replace legislative history 
as the appropriate method of interpretation. The Supreme Court might have made 
law in the sense that it created a right to appeal for relatives of illegitimate children. 
But it is clear that the Court’s understanding of the word ‘kinship’ was rooted 
firmly in the case law of the European Court interpreting the Convention which, as 
we know, takes a clear precedence over national law. The same story applied when 
in 1982 the Supreme Court spontaneously introduced the duty for parents to justify 
their decision not to let their underage children enter marriage.39 Where refusing 
their consent would be evidently unreasonable, the courts were allowed to 
substitute the parents’ withheld permission, ignoring Article 1:36 (2) of the Civil 
Code which prohibited the courts from allowing a marriage where one of the 
parents objected to it. Again, this judgment was backed up by several decisions of 
the European Commission on Human Rights. 
Halfway through the 1980s, the Court’s case law was at its peak in terms of 
self-consciousness. In 1984 it actually went one step further when it explicitly 
ordered the District Courts to set aside Section 1:161 (1) of the Civil Code, thereby 
fundamentally interfering in Dutch family law. This provision requires the courts 
when allowing a divorce to appoint both a guardian and a supervising guardian, 
consequently implying that parental authority ends with the divorce. On the basis 
of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court maintained that it should be possible for 
the courts to leave (joint) parental authority intact when such a course would be in 
the best interest of the child in question. It such cases the District Court had to set 
aside Section 1:161 (1), thus effectively allowing for dual custody.40 What was 
remarkable about this case – which, incidentally, is called the dual custody case – was 
that this time the Supreme Court had no clear mandate from either the European 
Court or the Commission when it held that the application of Section 1:161 (1) of the 
Civil Code violated the Convention. A more marginal and abstract review by the 
 
37 Supreme Court judgment of 18 January 1980, NJ 1980/463 (Illegitimate child). 
38 ECtHR 13 June 1979, Publ. Series-A, 13, p. 14-20 (Marckx v. Belgium). 
39 Supreme Court judgment of 4 June 1982, NJ 1983/32 (Parental Veto on Underage Marriage). See 
also the Supreme Court judgment of 20 December 1985, NJ 1987/54. 
40 Supreme Court judgment of 4 May 1984, NJ 1985/510 (Dual custody). 
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Court – leading to a different outcome – would probably have sufficed.41 
Furthermore, the case showed that the Court was prepared to make full use of its 
power under Article 94 of the Constitution to ignore an Act of Parliament in order 
to issue relief based on the violation of the Convention.42 The Dutch judiciary 
evidently was no longer reluctant but appeared to be downright eager to apply 
Convention law. Some years later, in 1986, the Court issued its famous – or 
infamous – so-called Spring decisions.43 They showed that the Court had not only 
overcome its reluctance to apply the Convention. It also developed a rather more 
self-conscious attitude towards legislation and its own ability to regulate certain 
areas of law such as family law. The decisions will be elaborated upon in the next 
section and we will consequently leave it at this for the moment. 
The 1980 s are usually regarded as the high watermark in the Supreme Court’s 
case law concerning fundamental rights review. They showed some of, what few 
have called the more ‘activist’ judgments of the Court. But they marked the 
beginning of a slow retreat as well. In some cases, by contrast, it exercised 
considerable restraint. For instance in the dual custody case we mentioned 
previously, the Court categorically refused to engage in judicial lawmaking (or 
rather in a positive sense in any case), and was only prepared to set aside the 
impugned statutory provision.44 The same year, 1984, witnessed the citizenship case, 
where the Court refused to remedy an alleged violation of Article 26 of the 
International Covenant because there were several ways of dealing with the 
unequal treatment (if there was indeed a difference in treatment) and choosing 
would mean encroaching on the policy prerogative of the legislature.45 We already 
touched on this judgment because it has led most authors to believe that the Court 
had applied the self-executing argument of Article 94 of the Constitution as an 
instrument to avoid entering into political territory. From the 1990s onwards, the 
Court explicitly recognised that it was not empowered to set aside national 
provisions for their inconsistency with Convention law, purely on the basis of its 
own interpretation of the Convention. In other words, it considered itself unable to 
offer claimants a broader understanding of the European Convention than the 
prevailing interpretation offered by the European Court.46 Accordingly, judicial 
 
41 For some discussion on this issue, see (in Dutch): Alkema’s Case Note under NJ 1985/510, 
and De Vet 1985, p. 218-222. In English: Van Dijk 1988a, p. 644. 
42 This was not the only case in which the Supreme Court was prepared to go that far. See, for 
instance, its judgments of 1 July 1983, NJ 1980/463 (Insanity Act); of 22 June 1988, NJ 1988/955 
(Additional Tax Claim); of 24 November 2000, NJ 2001/376 (Matos v. Dutch Antilles) and of 16 
November 2001, NJ 2002/469 (Pig Farming Reform Act). Especially the lower courts have 
reacted rather enthusiastically to this development. See the judgment of the District Court of 
Amsterdam dated 14 January 1992, NJ 1992/401; District Court of Maastricht, judgment of 11 
February 1993, NJ 1993/728; District Court of Amsterdam, judgment of 28 November 1995, 
NJ 1996/564, and Leeuwarden Court of Appeal 5 February 2003, NJ 2003/352. 
43 Joint Supreme Court decisions of 21 March 1986, NJ 1986/585-588 (Spring decisions). 
44 Supra note 40. 
45 Supra note 28. 
46 Supreme Court judgment of 19 October 1990, NJ 1992/129 (Gay marriage); Supreme Court 
judgment of 10 August 2001, NJ 2002/278 (Duty of support). 
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lawmaking without a clear mandate by the European Court of Human Rights 
remains a phenomenon of the previous century.47 
3.4. Concluding Remarks 
Together with the – as some might say – highly activist ‘Spring’ decisions, this case 
law created a difficult legacy, both for the Court itself and for legal scholarship. It 
did confirm that the Supreme Court considered itself competent to assume a 
lawmaking role – certainly in a negative, but sometimes even in a positive sense. 
But it raised questions as to what extent the Court was allowed to play such a role 
and what ought to be its obligations towards the victims of human rights violations. 
These questions will be discussed in the next section. What may be concluded from 
the current one is that although the judiciary was reluctant at first to apply the 
human rights treaties, it gradually overcame its cold feet. The 1980s constituted a 
phase wherein the Dutch courts accepted the human rights treaties, particularly the 
European Convention, as a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights for the 
Netherlands.48 Of course, the 1983 Constitution already provided a civil rights 
charter, but due to the ban on judicial review and its broad limitation clauses, it had 
only a limited role to play except perhaps for the political branches. The European 
Convention provided the courts with an enforceable equivalent.  
To some extent, this came as a real novelty to them. For decades the 
relationship between the courts and Parliament had largely been shaped by the 
existence of Article 120 of the Constitution, prohibiting the courts from reviewing 
any Act of Parliament. For all its particularities and exceptions, that provision 
constituted a bright-line rule for the courts to rely upon. Never before had they been 
confronted with the difficulties concerning the boundaries of their role with respect 
to the prerogatives of the legislature. Not to such an extent as they were confronted 
with in the 1980 s and the years to follow in any case. Their approach to this new 
question was initially not unequivocal or clear. Legal arguments concerning the 
positioning of the courts, the Supreme Court in particular, and Parliament scattered 
among several already existing doctrines. The Court and legal scholarship for 
instance tried to cope with some of the constitutional difficulties by using Article 
94’s self-executing requirement in a somewhat dexterous manner. They also tried to 
fit in the Supreme Court’s new role in the discussions about its lawmaking role in 
general, which primarily took place in the fields of civil and criminal law but 
certainly not constitutional law.49 This attracted the attention of constitutional 
 
47 This was also very clearly illustrated by the very recent Post-Salduz and Panovits case, where 
the Court, on the basis of Art. 6 of the Convention, introduced the duty for police authorities 
to provide suspected criminals access to an attorney if they so choose (Supreme Court 
judgment of 30 June 2009, NJ 2009/349). Introducing this requirement was backed, however, 
by two judgments of the European Court, ECtHR 27 November 2008, appl. 36391/02 (Salduz 
v. Turkey) and ECtHR 11 December 2008, appl. 4268/04 (Panovits v. Cyprus). 
48 Van Dijk 1988a, p. 649. 
49 This was observed by Alkema in his article (in Dutch), Alkema 2000, p. 1053-1058. See also De 
Lange 1991. 
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scholars to the debate on the lawmaking powers of the judiciary. And it is that 
debate to which we too will now turn our attention. 
4. The Lawmaking Role of the Courts 
4.1. Introduction 
As we have observed, fundamental rights review of parliamentary legislation in the 
Netherlands is highly dispersed in the sense that it is carried out largely by ordinary 
courts on the basis of international human rights law. This means that the 
constitutional position of courts engaging in fundamental rights review is 
essentially not different from that of the courts in general. Having a separate 
constitutional court to decide upon the constitutionality of statutes and their 
consequences might produce a separate set of rules regarding the proper 
boundaries for such a court. This is because it is not hierarchically subordinate to 
other courts nor can it, strictly speaking, subject other courts to its general 
jurisdiction. That is definitely not the case in the Netherlands, where constitutional 
review in the sense of rights review only takes place within the general judicial 
framework. The rules that govern the boundaries of ordinary statutory 
interpretation therefore apply equally to fundamental rights adjudication.  
A general characteristic of a civil law system is the lack of a doctrine of judicial 
precedent. The Dutch are no exception in this regard. Here, the concept of res 
judicata traditionally has a rather narrow meaning: it prevents the same parties from 
litigating the same case over again. Moreover, what the Court has dictated in its 
judgment, either on points of law or on points of fact, is lawfully binding, but 
theoretically only on the parties before it.50 The Dutch legal system officially does 
not recognise a doctrine of stare decisis, where courts are bound by their own 
precedents or the precedents of higher courts.51 In practice, however, the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court is generally followed by lower courts and sometimes – on a 
voluntary basis – even by the highest administrative courts.52 As the Supreme Court 
has the power to reverse decisions of the ordinary courts, there seems little point for 
the latter to do otherwise. Following the case law of the Supreme Court is thus 
largely a matter of pragmatism besides the more fundamental reason of equality.53 
The Supreme Court also considers itself to some extent bound by its own case law 
and frequently refers to it. In practice, therefore, the Court’s case law may be 
regarded as a source of law.54 However, that does not alter the fact that the Court 
operates in a civil law system, where the separation of powers traditionally places 
some weight on the fact that it is the duty of the legislature to make the law and that 
 
50 Van Hooijdonck & Eijsvoogel 2009, p. 39. 
51 See Loth 2009, p. 278. 
52 Ibid. 
53 That is even more true of the administrative courts, whose judgments are not under review 
from the Supreme Court. When administrative courts follow the Supreme Courts case law 
they do so on an entirely voluntary basis, mainly to serve the coherence of the law in general. 
54 Supra note 51. Moreover: Koopmans 1999, p. 124-125. 
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of the courts to apply it.55 And although this principle has, on the whole, never been 
applied very strictly in the Netherlands, it is certainly not an open-and-shut case 
that the courts have a lawmaking role to play. There is then a slight tension between 
Dutch constitutional theory on the one hand – more or less repudiating a 
lawmaking role for the courts – and current legal practice. 
In this section we will first describe the case law of the Supreme Court on its 
supposed lawmaking function. We will then turn to the justifications and the 
critique legal scholarship has offered in reaction to this case law. And finally, we 
will discuss some of the proposals that have recently been put forward to facilitate 
the Court’s lawmaking function. 
4.2. Defining the Process of Lawmaking 
It has often been said that the courts have always assumed a lawmaking role, even 
from the outset.56 The legal process simply is inconceivable without some judicial 
lawmaking. Until the 1980s, the Dutch Supreme Court never actually said that it 
had a duty to do so, but clearly it had always been forced to interpret the law. 
However, according to one prominent author, the Court was not likely to engage in 
lawmaking before 1960.57 That raises the question what the term ‘lawmaking’ 
actually stands for. When former president Martens of the Supreme Court spoke of 
lawmaking as intrinsic to judging a case in his remarkable farewell speech for the 
Court, he evidently used it in a different way than the prominent author we 
mentioned just now. Martens evidently used a broader notion of what constituted 
judicial lawmaking than the other author, whose use of the term came closer to 
what one might call ‘judicial activism’. 
Lawmaking in the spirit of Hans Kelsen is indeed intrinsic to the judicial 
process. The courts ‘create’ law just by interpreting a statute and applying it to an 
individual case.58 In that view any interpretation means creating law, no matter how 
close the court sticks to the literal wording of the provision in question. However, 
such lawmaking is hardly something to get excited about. True as the description in 
legal-theoretical terms may be, such a definition is far too broad to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate lawmaking. One may, however, also speak of 
lawmaking when the court deviates from the literal wording of a legislative text in 
order to fill a legal gap. In this sense, it is perfectly possible for the court to remain 
firmly within the boundaries of the system and the objectives (teleology) of the 
statute, but then again, it might not.59 Where that is the case, the court would have 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 See, for instance, a contribution by former Supreme Court president Martens 2000, p. 747. 
57 Schoordijk 1988, p. 8-9. 
58 See Kelsen 1934/1992, p. 68. 
59 This is what the German legal literature calls Gesetzesimmanente Rechtsfortbildung as opposed 
to Gesetzesübersteigende Rechtsfortbildung where the courts exceed such boundaries. See Larenz 
1991, p. 366-367. 
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to assume a clearly political role. In such cases, the Court, rather than the 
legislature, gives direction to society.60 
4.3. The Case Law of the Supreme Court concerning its Lawmaking Role 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch Supreme Court has 
increasingly assumed that it may not only apply the law but develop it as well.61 In 
1959, in Quint v. Te Poel, it explicitly ruled that where an Act of Parliament leaves a 
legal vacuum, the answer must lie within the existing statutory system.62 The Court 
thus firmly implied that it was obviously empowered to fill the gap. Moreover, it 
marked a clear boundary between what the court understood to be legitimate 
lawmaking in the sense of developing the law on the basis of existing law, and 
illegitimate lawmaking. That boundary was to be comprised by the existing 
statutory system. 
As we have already implied, the Court has explicitly recognised its lawmaking 
role in the 1980 s. In the Citizenship case of 1984 it mentioned a ‘lawmaking duty’ for 
the courts but quickly added that making policy decisions clearly exceeded this 
duty.63 Several authors have since noted that when the Court speaks of lawmaking, 
it nearly always does so in a negative way – refusing to accept a specific 
interpretation or remedy because that would outstretch its judicial role.64 When it 
does feel that it may fill a gap, it hardly ever argues why lawmaking in this 
particular case is justified. This is very clearly illustrated by two cases we have 
already mentioned. In the citizenship case of 1984 it ruled that the limitations of its 
lawmaking duty would not allow it to remedy a violation of Article 26 of the 
International Covenant, whereas in the Spring decisions of 1986, it made no reference 
whatsoever to its lawmaking duty in order to justify its rather consequential 
judgment.65 
After the Supreme Court openly coined its own ‘lawmaking duty’ in 1984, the 
legislature quickly followed suit. In 1988 it adopted the proposed Bill for a revised 
Judicial Organisation Act, in which a new Article 101a (currently Article 81) 
included specifically as the duties of the Supreme Court, to ‘secure the uniformity of 
the law and advance the development of the law’.66 With the ‘development of the 
 
60 For an example of this use of the term ‘lawmaking’, see Stolker 1993, p. 57. See further Bell 
1985, p. 6. 
61 See for instance its landmark case on the interpretation of torts: Lindenbaum v. Cohen, 
Supreme Court judgment of 31 January 1919, NJ 1919, p. 161. 
62 Supreme Court judgment of 30 January 1959, NJ 1959/548 (Quint v. Te Poel). 
63 Supra note 28. 
64 See, for instance (in Dutch) Kortmann 2005, p. 250. 
65 Although admittedly, the Advocate General had extensively gone into the matter. See the 
Supreme Court judgments of 12 October 1984, NJ 1985/230 (Dutch citizenship), and of 21 
March 1986, NJ 1986/585-588 (Spring Judgments). 
66 Act of 1827 concerning the Judicial Organisation, Stb. 1827, 20, most recently amended on 
December 11, 2008, Stb. 2009, 8.  
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law’ Parliament clearly recognised a lawmaking duty for the courts.67 However, the 
question remains what constitutes ‘development of the law’ and what exceeds mere 
development and turns into (illegitimate) lawmaking.  
4.3.1. The Dual Custody Case: Distinguishing Positive from Negative 
Lawmaking 
In its 1984 judgment on dual custody, the Supreme Court followed the line of 
reasoning it had already set out in the 1959 Quint v. Te Poel case and applied it for 
the first time to fundamental rights review. As we have seen before, this case 
concerned the applicability of Section 1:161 (1) of the Civil Code, which required the 
courts to appoint one guardian when granting a divorce.68 In a case before the 
District Court of Amsterdam, the parents of six-year-old Ingolf requested joint 
custody after the divorce. The District Court refused the request, arguing that its 
duty pursuant to Section 1:161 (1) to appoint one guardian clearly ruled out the 
possibility of appointing two. Appealing the decision, the parents invoked Article 8 
of the ECHR. However the Supreme Court agreed with the District Court. It argued 
that the legal system did not allow joint guardianship, not even on the basis of 
Article 8 of the Convention. This interpretation of Article 1:161 (1) of the Civil Code 
would outstretch the judicial function as it would engage the Court in positive 
legislating. It considered that introducing dual custody would not easily fit into the 
existing statutory system. It did not explain why that was the case, nor had the 
Advocate General done so (he had actually argued the opposite), but there it was. 
Yet, the Court managed to find a solution. The justices pointed out that Article 94 
may not have allowed them to positively engage in judicial rulemaking but it did 
give them the power to set aside certain provisions of the Civil Code on the ground 
that their application would violate the Convention. Considering that ignoring 
Section 1:161 (1) would leave parental authority – on the basis of Article 1:161 (4) of 
the Civil Code – intact, it subsequently ordered the District Court to enquire 
whether joint responsibility for both parents would serve the child’s best interest.69 
What the dual custody case shows remarkably well is that the Court made a 
crucial distinction between its power (based on Article 94) to set aside the Civil 
Code on the one hand and on the other, its lack of power to settle the issue by 
promulgating its own, more convenient, rules if those rules were incompatible with 
the existing statutory scheme. Ignoring one statutory provision in order to apply 
another hardly qualifies as doing justice to this statutory scheme but evidently the 
 
67 Koopmans 1999, p. 131; Martens 2000, p. 747. Recognition of the lawmaking duty of the 
courts moreover appeared in some correspondence between the Minister for Justice and the 
Second Chamber of Parliament in 1989 (after the adoption of the Bill), where the minister 
mentioned three duties for the Supreme Court: securing the uniform application of the law, 
leading the development of the law and provide individuals with adequate legal protection. 
He marked the first two elements as a ‘the lawmaking duty’ (Kamerstukken II 1988/89, 21 206, 
No. 2, p. 42).  
68 Supra note 62. 
69 Supreme Court judgment of 4 May 1984, NJ 1985/510 (Dual custody). 
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Court took Article 94 of the Constitution for a clear mandate to deviate from that 
scheme so long as it stayed on the negative side by ‘just’ ignoring a provision.  
4.3.2. The Dutch Citizenship Case: Avoiding Policy Decisions 
The 1984 citizenship judgment, in which the Court explicitly recognized its 
lawmaking duty, added a new dimension to this. In this case the Court was 
confronted with a claim of an illegal immigrant who, during his stay in the 
Netherlands, had married a Dutch woman. Because his stay in the Netherlands was 
illegal and because he had built up quite a remarkable criminal record, he was 
asked to leave. The applicant then informed the authorities of his wish to acquire 
Dutch nationality. He relied upon Article 8 of the Nationality Act, granting the 
foreign wife of a Dutch husband the right to acquire Dutch nationality by informing 
the authorities of her wish. However, the provision obviously applied only to 
women, not men. The applicant argued that Article 8 violated paragraph 26 of the 
International Covenant and had therefore to be interpreted in such a way that men 
too had the right to acquire Dutch nationality. The Court did not accept the 
argument. It even refused to review whether the Act violated the Covenant because 
had it found a violation, it would not have been able to remedy the situation. Unlike 
in the dual custody case, setting aside the statute would clearly not benefit the 
claimant because the provision was positively phrased. It did not deny the applicant 
a right, just awarded it under-inclusively to women. Setting aside the statute would 
only deprive women of their privileged position, however women in general were 
not party to the case.  
The question thus became whether the Court was allowed to read in the words 
‘and men’ in the provision, thereby widening its scope. Under the Quint v. Te Poel 
reasoning, the issue would have been whether such ‘reading in’ would contradict 
the statutory scheme. It might have done, but the Court did not go into that. 
Instead, it argued that widening the scope to include men would not be the only 
lawful solution. Article 26 of the ICCPR merely prohibited unequal treatment and to 
abrogate the right for women was just as lawful as extending the right to men. This 
was a matter of policy and to choose between the two would be to encroach upon 
the political prerogative of Parliament. And so the Court left open the question 
whether the statutory provision violated Article 26 of the Covenant and turned 
down the applicant’s claim. It thereby added to its discourse a new ground to 
abstain from issuing a remedy: it was not prepared to choose between different 
policy outcomes. What might also have played a role though is the fact that at the 
time of the judgment a new statutory scheme had already been introduced in 
Parliament. 
The citizenship judgment has received some criticism for its perceived overspill 
of judicial restraint.70 It is striking therefore that the Court delivered two judgments 
that are widely considered to be among its most activist only a year later.71 
 
70 See Van Dijk 1988b, p. 199-202. 
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4.3.3. The Spring Decisions: Judicial Activism or Prudent Lawmaking? 
September 21, 1984: a child was born from two parents. That was not unusual. 
Indeed, most people are born from two parents. Nature will not have it any other 
way, at least not for the time being. What was so special about this case was that the 
parents were not married at the time of birth nor had they ever been married or had 
they any intention of doing so in the near future. They were happily living together 
and saw no need for marriage. That had been quite unusual for decades, but in the 
1970s and 1980s more and more people in the Netherlands decided not to marry. 
Under Dutch law, such parents could exercise no parental authority at all. They 
could only obtain shared guardianship. The Court held that this distinction violated 
Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention. What followed was an obscure 
mixture of setting aside certain provisions of the Civil Code while extensively 
interpreting others so that they might be read consistently with the Convention. The 
Court thus elaborately tried to regulate the conditions under which a request for 
joint parental authority was to be granted by the courts. The Court devoted an 
entire page in the case reports to describe these conditions. It did not elaborate on 
the question as to what authorised the Court to issue such regulations. They were 
not formally proclaimed or anything, but were mentioned as part of the 
interpretation of the Civil Code. What the Court effectively did was providing 
lower courts with a manual how to work through these difficult cases by using their 
combined powers to set aside and reinterpret national law in a uniform and 
Convention-proof manner. It probably considered it necessary to do so in the 
interest of legal certainty. However, as one author wrote: ‘This is legislation rather 
than judgment’.72 The question may well be asked whether such an extensive 
interpretation suited the contemporary statutory scheme. It probably did not. To 
that extent, the judgment did not seem to meet the criterion of the 1959 Quint v. Te 
Poel judgment. Moreover, many political policy issues were involved here. The 
question might equally be asked why the Court did not make reference to the 
criterion it had set out in its citizenship judgment just one year earlier. 
4.3.4. After the High Watermark: a Slow Retreat to Judicial Restraint 
After the 1980’s, the Supreme Court began its slow retreat to an attitude of greater 
judicial restraint. It increasingly refused to review Acts of Parliament based on the 
argument that it was not in a position to offer a remedy. In a vast number of cases it 
followed the reasoning it had already followed in the citizenship judgment.73 The 
Spring decisions had fundamentally changed Dutch family law, but they remained 
exceptions in the fundamental rights case law of the Court. What changed, though, 
was that the Court sometimes applied the citizenship reasoning even in cases where 
 
71 Supra note 43. 
72 Alkema in his Case Note under the judgment in NJ 1986/588. 
73 See for instance the Supreme Court judgments of 16 November 1990, NJ 1991/475 (Paternity), 
and 8 July 1994, NJ 1995/30 (Expert Witness). 
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it might have had the opportunity to set aside a provision on the basis of Article 94 
of the Constitution. The sharp contrast it had introduced in the dual custody case, 
when it said that it could not add something to the law but was able to set it aside 
(effectively reaching the same outcome) might not have really been abandoned but 
it was certainly blurred to some extent. The Court may have taken in some of the 
critique of Advocate General Moltmaker in the Spring cases. He argued that the 
difference between filling a gap and setting aside a provision is of a formal rather 
than of a substantive nature.74 For Moltmaker, there existed no clear distinction 
between negative and positive lawmaking. 
Whenever setting aside a statute would have rather undesirable consequences, 
either because that would create a legal gap or otherwise, the Court would abstain 
from doing so. In the 1998 Car expenses deduction case for instance, the Court 
refrained from setting aside a provision of the Income Tax Act 1964, because even 
though it would have solved the relevant inequality, it would instantly have 
introduced another inequality.75 In another case concerning court levies, its motive 
not to set aside the statutory provision probably resulted from fear for the financial 
consequences for public expenditure.76 Incidentally, the Court even applied the 
citizenship reasoning to cases where setting aside the statute would have been an 
appropriate remedy. Thus in a 1997 case concerning the possibility for two women 
to adopt a child, it refused to review whether Article 1:227 of the Civil Code – which 
effectively excluded same-sex couples from adopting a child – violated Articles 8 
and 14 of the European Convention.77 It followed the reasoning of the Advocate 
General, who had argued that there were several possible policy outcomes and as 
setting aside the statute would lead to one of them, by doing so the Court would 
make a political choice, which of course would not do. 
4.3.5. Towards a New Model: the 1999 Labour Expenses Deduction Judgment 
In the 1990s, several scholars expressed their uneasiness with regard to the 
abstaining practice.78 Some of the questions that arose were whether Article 94 of 
the Constitution allowed such a move and how abstaining had to be considered 
from the perspective of effective legal protection of fundamental rights. The Court 
eventually responded with a landmark judgment in 1999, which addressed both 
questions by introducing a new model composed of elements of some of the cases 
we have just discussed.79 
The case itself concerned a technicality regarding the tax deduction for those 
with relatively high labour costs as compared to those with standard labour costs. 
 
74 See para. 6.1.3 of the Advocate General’s conclusion. 
75 Supreme Court judgment of 15 July 1998, BNB 1998/293 (Car expenses  Deduction). 
76 Supreme Court judgment of 30 September 1992, BNB 1993/30 (Court Fees). Fear for a heavy 
burden also played a role in Supreme Court judgment of 28 May 2004, NJ 2006/430 
(Probationay Release). 
77 Supreme Court judgment of 5 September 1997, NJ 1998/686 (Double  Mothers). 
78 See, e.g. De Wet 2008, p. 241-242. 
79 Supreme Court judgment of 12 May 1999, NJ 2000/170 (Labour expenses  deduction). 
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We will not discuss the facts of the case here. What matters is that the Court was 
confronted with a relatively clear inequality between the two groups in Article 37 of 
the Income Tax Act 1964. It explicitly considered this provision to be in violation of 
Articles 14 and 1 of the European Convention’s First Protocol. The Court then 
proceeded to the question whether it was in a position to remove the inequality. It 
eventually concluded that it was not. But in doing so, it merged some of different 
lines of reasoning of its previous case law, adding to that a few drops of the concern 
articulated by legal scholarship. 
For the very first time the Court connected its supposed lawmaking duty to 
the principle of effective legal protection. It implied that it was obviously under a 
duty to provide adequate protection and started off by stressing that to set aside the 
impugned provision was not a sound option, as this would not benefit the claimant. 
As was the case in the citizenship judgment, Article 37 of the Income Tax Act was 
positively framed in the sense that it allowed a deduction for an under-inclusively 
phrased group. The Court thus considered that to set aside the provision would not, 
on its own accord, create a right to the deduction for the discriminated group. This 
is important because what the Court appears to have implied is that if setting aside 
the statute had been a suitable remedy for the applicant, it would have done so – 
even if that had ultimately led to only one of several possible outcomes. Like in the 
dual custody case, the Court would then take Article 94 of the Constitution for a clear 
mandate to act. The Court may therefore have dismissed its cautious attitude in the 
1997 Same-sex Parents case, where it had refused to set aside the statutory provision 
on the basis that there were other legitimate policy outcomes as well.80 
The Court then proceeded to examine in what way it could possibly provide a 
remedy, given the fact that setting aside the statute on the basis of Article 94 was of 
no use. It considered that there was a legal gap concerning the question whether or 
not the applicant had a right to the deduction. It could either fill this gap on its own 
initiative or leave the matter for the legislature. The answer to the question which 
course to take, according to the Court, depended on the outcome of a balancing test 
involving on the one hand the principle of effective legal protection and on the 
other some desirable judicial restraint ‘in the current constitutional structure’. The 
Court finally gave some clues as to how such balancing should take place, using its 
earlier case law as a catalogue of topoi. From its Quint v. Te Poel reasoning it derived 
that if the existing statutory scheme provided clues for deciding the case, it would 
fill the gap.81 If on the other hand there were different policy outcomes to choose 
from, choosing between them would – for the time being – be a matter best left for 
the political branches.82 This consideration led some authors to carefully try and 
compare it to the political question doctrine of the US Supreme Court.83 
The Court did also, uncharacteristically, explain why it was not prepared to 
interfere in the legislative process when there were different policy outcomes to 
 
80 Supra note 77. 
81 See also the Supreme Court judgment of 17 August 1998, BNB 1999/123 (Commercial 
registration number plates). 
82 Which basically is the Dutch citizenship line of reasoning (supra note 28). 
83 Unfortunately, only in Dutch: See Bovend’Eert 2009, p. 151; De Werd 2004, p. 69-126. 
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choose amongst. It stressed that the courts had to observe some ‘desirable judicial 
restraint’ and that it had only limited possibilities to engage in a quasi-legislative 
process.84 Its explanation was of course primarily intended for the ears of those who 
had been critical of the Court’s restrained attitude in years leading up to the 
judgment. To that end the Court added one other remark. As we have seen, the 
Court had taken the view that if such a situation arose where there were different 
policy outcomes to choose from, it would for the time being leave the matter for the 
legislature to decide. It then explicitly stressed that the outcome of its ´balancing 
test´ might be different if the legislature was familiar with the inconsistency and 
chose to ignore it. What the Court said in fact was that it assumed itself competent 
to engage in lawmaking even where that meant taking policy decisions, but it had 
to wait for the legislature to act first. Yet, if Parliament deliberately maintained the 
incompatible regulation, the Court would not hesitate to do whatever it thought 
Parliament evidently might or in any case should have done. 
There is a remarkable paradox here with the approach taken by the Court in 
its case law concerning the ban on judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes 
as laid down in Article 120 of the Constitution. In its celebrated Harmonisation Act 
judgment of 1989, the Court had ruled that it may not declare statutory provisions 
void for their lack of consistency with either the Constitution or legal principles.85 
But as we have seen, it made an exception for cases where Parliament could not 
have known about the inconsistency. It then implicitly assumed that Parliament 
would have wanted it not to apply the incompatible provision. This approach 
appears to deviate from the Labour expenses deduction approach, where the Court 
considered itself competent to legislate if Parliament had knowingly failed to do so. 
The difference between the two approaches lies in the nature of the review 
undertaken by the Court. With respect to Article 120 of the Constitution, the Court 
has to observe the fact that the question whether a statute is in fact constitutional is 
ultimately for Parliament to decide upon. The Dutch version of parliamentary 
sovereignty (as far as it exists) therefore fundamentally differs from that of the 
United Kingdom where, as Dicey phrased it, ´Parliament has the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever´.86 The Dutch Parliament may certainly not make or 
unmake any law whatsoever. Its powers are limited by the Constitution. However, 
Article 120 reserves for Parliament the right to have the ultimate say on the question 
whether it has overstepped such limitations. So the Courts may not only safely 
assume that it is Parliament’s desire to legislate in conformity with the Constitution, 
they must respect the fiction even when it is very clear that Parliament has actually 
no such intention at all. The situation is different with regard to treaty law. Here the 
same assumption applies: the legislator aims to legislate in compliance with its 
 
84 Already in 1993, a study showed that the reasons for the Court to refrain from positive 
lawmaking (or as the study called it, ‘engaging in politics in the sense of giving direction to 
society’), were primarily of a rather practical nature, basically boiling down to the question 
whether the Court would be able to regulate in issue in society. See (in Dutch) Stolker 1993, 
supra note 60, and for a revised version Uzman & Stolker 2009, p. 475-496. 
85 Supra note 17. 
86 Dicey 1885/1959, p. 3-4. 
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international obligations but the question whether it has actually done so is 
ultimately a matter for the courts to decide upon. Article 94 of the Constitution 
makes that painfully clear. If Parliament therefore knowingly ignores its obligation 
to legislate consistently with, for instance, the European Convention, the courts 
must intervene and ultimately issue a remedy. The relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the legislature is then much more one between equals than the 
relationship with regard to constitutional review where Parliament has the 
authoritative say.  
In the case at hand, the Labour expenses deduction case, the Court developed a 
line of reasoning it had already put in practice some years before. In another tax 
decision, this time concerning commercial registration number plates, the Court had 
been willing to grant the victims of an unequal treatment the benefit they had been 
denied by the legislature.87 Of course, there was no clear obligation for Parliament 
to grant these car owners the impugned benefit. It could equally have decided to 
abolish the entire scheme. There were then two choices. And yet, the Court felt that 
it was entitled to choose the first option without leaving the matter for Parliament. 
There were two reasons for this. First of all, the government had actually warned 
Parliament that its amendment would most probably violate the Convention. 
Parliament had not in any way contradicted this statement but had nevertheless 
passed the bill amended. It was therefore painfully clear that Parliament had 
knowingly legislated inconsistently with the Convention. Moreover, granting the 
aggrieved car owners the benefit was exactly what the government had proposed to 
do in the first place. It therefore fitted in neatly with the existing statutory scheme 
and thus met the important criterion of the 1959 Quint v. Te Poel case. 
On the other hand, it has now become clear that the Court is not very likely to 
assume that the legislature has consciously left a violation intact. After the 1997 
Number Plates judgment the Court has never actually considered filling a gap when 
there were policy choices to make. Quite the contrary, when confronted with the 
alleged sluggishness of the legislature in amending the law in a few cases where the 
Court had declared the Act incompatible with Convention rights, it explicitly 
accepted the argument of the government that it had tried to amend the law with all 
deliberate speed.88 In the same judgments it has also ruled that when remedying the 
inconsistency, Parliament may freely choose to change the law only for the future in 
the sense that it need not necessarily enact its amendments with retroactive effect.89 
The 1999 Labour expenses deduction judgment basically sums up the Court’s 
attitude to positive and negative lawmaking in fundamental rights cases. It is now 
clear that the Court recognises its duty to provide effective redress to claimants who 
 
87 Supra note 81. This was a case in 1997, but already in 1990 the Court had mentioned its 
readiness to issue a remedy if Parliament did not take up the matter after the Court had 
expressed its concerns. See the Supreme Court judgment of 31 January 1990, NJ 1990/403 
(Unreasonable delay). 
88 Supreme Court judgments of 24 January 2001, BNB 2001/291, and 14 June 2002, BNB 
2002/289 (Labor Expenses  Deduction II). 
89 Ibid. 
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successfully invoke human rights treaties. Moreover, it has developed a kind of 
step-by-step plan in order to decide on the nature of the redress. 
1. First of all, it will always try to interpret any indefinite provision consistently 
with the treaty provision in question;  
2. Second, it will try to provide redress by means of negative lawmaking: it 
examines whether setting aside the impugned provision might settle the case.  
Only if that is not the case does the question arise whether the Court may engage in 
positive lawmaking by using its interpretative mandate.  
3. As a matter of principle, it considers itself empowered to do so when there is a 
clear alternative which agrees with the existing statutory scheme.  
4. It should leave the matter for Parliament to resolve when there are policy deci-
sions at stake. The Court will then not easily encroach upon the political pre-
rogative of Parliament. 
5. But it is – at least theoretically – prepared to do so when Parliament evidently 
has no intention of putting things right within a reasonable period of time.  
The Court generally complies with its own framework and it may therefore be said 
that it usually exercises judicial constraint when it comes to positive lawmaking in 
the sense of issuing regulations on the basis of its duty to interpret the law. There is 
one notable exception, however, to this general rule. And we will turn our attention 
briefly to that exception. 
4.3.6. The Exception to the Rule: European Union Law 
Where a statute violates European Union law rather than the European Convention 
on human rights or one of the other human rights treaties, the Supreme Court does 
not consider it possible to leave the matter for the legislature. The basic assumption 
for the Supreme Court is that Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution – regulating the 
effects of international law in the domestic legal order – do not apply to European 
Union law. As early as 1963, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in its 
landmark cases Van Gend & Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. that the European legal order 
is fundamentally monistic, meaning that Community law is both of direct effect and 
superior to any kind of national law (including national constitutions) on its own 
accord.90 The Dutch Supreme Court has never challenged this claim and in 2004 it 
even accepted it explicitly.91 This effectively means that it is ultimately the law of 
the EU itself which, in the view of the Supreme Court, determines the extent to 
which Community law affects the Dutch legal order. To that end the European 
Court of Justice has derived some very stringent rules concerning the effective legal 
protection of Community law by the national courts from the EC Treaty. Although 
 
90 Supra note 7. 
91 Supreme Court judgment of 2 November 2004, NJ 2005/80 (Compulsary break). 
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the ECJ has consistently ruled that the effects of an inconsistency between national 
and Community law are a matter for national courts to deal with, it has 
simultaneously laid down some minimum guidelines in order to secure the uniform 
and effective application of Community law throughout the Union.92 National 
courts are required to interpret national law as far as possible in conformity with 
Community law.93 Would such an interpretation, according to the national rules of 
adjudication, prove to be impossible, then the national court in question is obliged 
to set aside the national rule.94 The ECJ has moreover underlined that any national 
rule which handicaps the possibilities for courts to secure the uniform and effective 
execution of Community law must be put aside as well.95 Mitigating the undesired 
consequences of the application of Community law can be considered only by the 
ECJ itself.96 Last but not least, the ECJ takes a relatively straightforward approach to 
remedies in discrimination cases. In such cases the national courts will have to 
extend the more favourable rule to the aggrieved party as well.97 The ECJ does not 
consider such an extension to be any kind of policy decision, but a logical outcome 
of applying the principle of non-discrimination to a given case, thereby deviating 
considerably from the approach usually adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court has faithfully carried out its duties under Community law 
in this respect. A recent example taken from the field of taxation might illustrate 
this. In the Ilhan case, the Court determined that Article 1 of the Car and Motorcycle 
Taxation Act constituted a violation of Articles 43 and 55 of the EC Treaty.98 It 
considered that modifying – and consequently interpreting the statutory provision 
consistently with Community law – would outstretch its lawmaking duties as the 
existing statutory scheme and its legislative history did not yield any particular way 
forward. However, it refused to consider leaving the matter for Parliament, as it 
surely would have done, had it concerned a case under a human rights treaty. In 
stead it decided to set aside the Act at large, thereby effectively annulling the entire 
tax measure.99 In order to provide the required redress, the Court thus fell back on 
to its classical role of a Kelsenian negative legislator. 
 
92 See, for instance, ECJ judgments of 27 March 1980, Case 61/79 (Denkavit); of 30 April 1998, C-
37-38/96 (Sodiprem); of 16 January 2003, C-265/01 (Pansard), and of 6 March 2007, C-292/04 
(Meilicke). 
93 Supra note 8. 
94 See a.o.: ECJ judgments of 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 (Costa t. E.N.E.L.), and of 9 March 1978, 
Case 106/77 (Simmenthal). 
95 See, for instance, the Simmenthal judgment in the previous footnote. 
96 ECJ judgments of 17 May 1990, C-262/88, (Barber v. Guardian); 1 April 2008, C-267/06 (Tadao 
Maruko). 
97 See a.o.: ECJ judgments of 27 June 1990, C-33/89 (Kowalska), and of 26 January 1999, C-18/95 
(Terhoeve). 
98 Supreme Court judgment of 14 November 2008, BNB 2009/3 (Ilhan). 
99 The Judicial division of the Council of State seems to take a less rigorous stand. In the Eman & 
Sevinger case it did invoke the limits of its lawmaking duties in a case concerning EU law, 
supra note 10. 
J. UZMAN, T. BARKHUYSEN & M.L. VAN EMMERIK 
 27 
4.4. Reactions of ‘la doctrine’ after 1999 
As we have seen, there has always been a considerable debate on the question 
whether the courts have a lawmaking role to play and if so, how far this role might 
be stretched. This has traditionally been a debate among civil lawyers interested in 
methods of interpretation. But as the role of the courts with respect to fundamental 
rights review changed and increased in the 1980 s, the lawmaking powers of the 
ordinary courts clearly became a matter of constitutional law. This presented 
constitutional scholars with the basic question whether the traditional doctrines on 
the role of the courts were adequate in the field of fundamental rights review.100 
However, such was the general consensus among civil lawyers by now that the 
courts were under a clear duty to develop and shape the law that there was also 
from the very outset among constitutional scholars a tendency to agree on the basic 
fact that the courts had a considerable lawmaking role to play.101 Dutch 
constitutional doctrine has therefore never been very fundamentally critical of the 
courts acting as a positive legislator. What is more, the term ‘positive legislator’ 
would hardly be used at all. 
Consensus somewhat eroded in 2005 as a Nijmegen law professor questioned 
the lawmaking duty of the courts.102 He argued that this ‘so-called lawmaking duty’ 
was an invention by the Supreme Court itself, the creation of which was to a large 
extent itself a piece of lawmaking without any basis in written law.103 However, he 
was not the only one critical of the Supreme Court’s attitude. At the other end of the 
spectre, there had already been scholars arguing that the Court’s attitude towards 
individual victims was possibly too restrained to provide effective legal redress.104 
In short, the debate was renewed. 
Today legal scholarship can roughly be divided into three categories. First, 
there are those who are of the opinion that there is no legal basis whatsoever for the 
courts to engage in lawmaking.105 Courts decide cases and in the process of doing 
that, they might ‘find’ and apply the law but they do certainly not go about creating 
it. Second, probably the vast majority of scholars argue that there is a role for the 
courts with respect to judicial lawmaking, but it is equally clear that it should 
primarily be Parliament that enacts the law.106 They generally assume that Article 81 
of the Judicial Organisation Act provides a clear basis for the courts to develop – 
and thus shape – the law, even if that means engaging in an activity close to 
legislating. They expressly reject the argument that the Supreme Court may never 
engage in lawmaking because it lacks the appropriate democratic legitimacy. Most 
 
100 See a.o. the authors mentioned in footnote 49. 
101 This attitude was expressed in 2000 by the parting president of the Supreme Court Martens in 
his farewell speech (supra note 56). 
102 Kortmann 2005. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Van Dijk 1988b; Martens 2000; Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2006, p. 63. 
105 Supra note 102. Moreover: Schutte 2009, p. 676-680. 
106 See, for instance, Koopmans 1999, p. 134; Martens 2000, p. 751; Brenninkmeijer 2001, p. 26; De 
Werd 2004, p. 120. 
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of them assume that the courts do not derive their legitimacy no from any 
democratic principle but from the rule of law.107 However, this group lacks 
coherence in the sense that although most scholars agree that the courts have a 
lawmaking role to play when reviewing legislation, they differ on the extent of the 
lawmaking duty. The basic question here is whether the courts may encroach upon 
the policy prerogative of the legislature. There are those who think the courts 
clearly incompetent to do so.108 They consequently disagree with the stance the 
Supreme Court has taken in its Labour expenses deduction judgment, when it 
abstained from lawmaking but warned that it might in the future decide otherwise 
if Parliament remained inactive.109 Others maintain that although it is usually 
improper for the courts to engage in politically sensitive issues, it may nonetheless 
be necessary for them to do so in order to provide effective redress.110 
Apart from this difference in opinion, the common denominator of this second 
group is that it regards lawmaking by the courts as possible but clearly the 
exception. It is first of all a spin-off of deciding individual cases and, in the case of 
fundamental rights review, something necessary but abnormal. Setting aside 
statutory law and subsequently formulating guidelines for society are not the core 
business of the courts but of Parliament.111 They stress, in other words, the primacy 
of Parliament in policy-making and legislating.112 There is, however, a third group 
of authors that appears to argue for a more sweeping understanding of the 
lawmaking role of the courts. For such authors, the courts – especially the Supreme 
Court – and the legislature are ‘partners in the business of the law’.113 Building 
firmly on the civilian tradition, they argue that Parliament is just not able to 
anticipate every sudden change of direction society takes. Therefore, judge-made 
law is now ‘an absolute must’, its contribution to the development of the law 
indispensable and it should certainly not be regarded as the exception but rather as 
the rule.114 Looking after the parties of the case at hand is not the only primary duty 
of the courts: they have an equally important duty towards the development of the 
law in general as well. However, one may wonder whether such scholars are still 
addressing the same subject. As we have seen, there is some disagreement about the 
extent to which the term ‘lawmaking’ ought to be used. The civil law approach is 
very much directed towards the filling of legal gaps the legislature is simply unable 
to fill. That situation substantially differs from what concerns constitutional scholars 
most, that is when the courts must set aside a clear statutory provision which 
nevertheless fails to produce an appropriate remedy for the case at hand. Still, the 
Dutch debate on the lawmaking powers of the courts is very much fashioned by the 
 
107 See the authors mentioned in the previous footnote. Critically however: Bovend’Eert 2009, p. 
142-143. 
108 Most recently for instance Bovend’Eert 2009, p. 143 (see the previous footnote). 
109 See the previous section. 
110 Notably Martens 2000, p. 751; Moreover Happé 1999, p. 43; Adams 2009, p. 1098. 
111 See the ouline drawn up by Bovend’Eert 2009, p. 140-142. 
112 See also Adams 2009, p. 1098. 
113 See e.g. Vranken 2006, p. 8-9. 
114 Ibid. 
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existence of this group. As we will see in the next section, their efforts seem to have 
influenced the Supreme Court as well as the legislature and reforms are now under 
way to adapt the Court’s position in the legal system to its lawmaking role. 
5. Means and Effects of Judicial Review 
5.1. Introduction 
In this section we will offer a brief outline of the way in which dialogue between the 
courts, the parties of the individual case and the legislature is shaped. Particular 
topics include the specific procedures to attain a remedy for a human rights 
violation (including legislative omissions), specific injunctions concerning unlawful 
legislation, and the effects of decisions concerning rights review. Moreover, we will 
turn our attention briefly to the specific techniques the Supreme Court occasionally 
applies to mitigate the consequences of its lawmaking activities. 
5.2. Procedures available to Enforce Fundamental Rights Law 
As we have said before, the Netherlands does not have a constitutional court. 
Consequently, there are no specific procedures for claimants to complain about 
infringements of fundamental rights. No Recurso de ampáro, habeas corpus or 
Verfassungsbeschwerde exist in the Dutch legal order. As we have noted before, this 
does not mean that the courts have no role to play when confronted with violations 
of (international) human rights. As long as the right in question is laid down in a 
self-executing treaty provision, the courts may review legislation for its consistency 
with such rights both in a direct and an indirect way. 
The power for the ordinary and administrative courts to review legislative 
rules for their consistency with higher laws was already established in 1864.115 As 
we have discussed, rules of international law automatically take precedence over 
national rules and are therefore recognised as ‘higher law’ in the Dutch legal order. 
Should the courts conclude that national provisions are inconsistent with treaty law 
then, as we have seen, they must either interpret the provision in conformity with 
the treaty or, if that is impossible, set aside the national provision on the basis of 
Article 94 of the Constitution. The courts then apply either remaining national law 
or the norm of the treaty provision itself. This may ultimately lead to a remedy by 
way of granting the requested permit after all, awarding damages or acquittal of 
criminal charges, whatever the case may be. It is important, however, to stress that 
Article 94 of the Constitution does not empower the courts to declare statutes void. 
It only requires the courts to set aside individual provisions in individual cases. 
Direct review of legislation is also a possibility, be it that it does not happen 
very often with regard to statutes. The bulk of both positive and negative legislating 
by the courts with regard to primary law takes place in procedures of indirect 
review. But having said that, it is certainly possible to start civil proceedings against 
 
115 Supreme Court judgment of 6 March 1864, W 2646 (Pothuys), supra note 21. 
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the State for unlawfully enacting a statute. In a landmark judgment of the Supreme 
Court called Pocketbooks II, the Court ruled that Article 1401 of the Civil Code 
(currently Article 6:162), which concerns a general tort, was generally applicable to 
the legislative function of the government.116 Although successful appeals 
concerning the unlawfulness of primary legislation remain very scarce, it is by no 
means impossible that the Supreme Court may one day accept this kind of claim. In 
the 2001 (first) Pig farming Reform Act judgment, the Court was in any case prepared 
to review whether some of the Bill’s provisions constituted an unlawful act in the 
framework of Article 6.162 of the Civil Code, rendering the State liable for 
damages.117 
5.3. Remedies for Fundamental Rights Violations 
The difficult question, however, is not whether the courts may accept a claim 
concerning the lawful enactment and application of an Act of Parliament, but the 
question rather is what remedies they may issue when they conclude the Act to be 
inconsistent with international law.118 Perhaps the least difficult remedy in this 
particular respect is the power of the civil courts to award damages for unlawful 
legislation. This may certainly be an option.119 Another available remedy concerns 
the power of the courts to issue a declaratory judgment to the effect that the enacted 
bill is unlawful, where the unlawfulness may of course arise from incompatibility 
with international treaty law. Such declarations may be made by all ordinary courts 
whether low or Supreme, and as we will see in the next section, they can formally 
only bind the parties in the case at hand. In practice, however, the binding force of 
such declarations is rather substantive. The courts may also issue an injunction to 
the effect that the government may not apply to the impugned Act. This is called 
buitenwerkingstelling (‘rendering inapplicable’). Like declaratory judgments and 
other decisions by the regular courts, this kind of injunction formally only binds the 
parties before the court.120 However, it is possible for interest groups, for example, 
to claim that the government be ordered not to apply the statute in question in any 
case.121 Third parties may therefore profit from such a judgment in the sense that 
applying the statutory provision in their cases would constitute another unlawful 
Act towards the original claimant. 
There are also injunctions, however, which the courts consider themselves 
prohibited from applying. The courts do not have the power to annul Acts of 
Parliament or indeed any other kind of legislation. An injunction formally 
 
116 Supreme Court judgment of 24 January 1969, NJ 1969/316 (Pocketbooks II). 
117 Supreme Court judgment of 16 November 2001, NJ 2002/469 (Pig Farming Reform Act). 
Moreover see Supreme Court judgment of 14 April 2000, NJ 2000/713 (Kooren Maritiem v. the 
State). 
118 Cf. Schutgens 2009, p. 36-39. 
119 See a.o. the Pig farming Reform Act judgment, supra note 117.  
120 See Supreme Court judgment of 1 July 1983, NJ 1984/360 (LSV). Moreover: Schutgens 2009, p. 
78 ff. 
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compelling the State to withdraw a particular piece of legislation – no matter how 
unlawful it is – cannot be issued.122 Such an order would be tantamount to quashing 
the provision, to which the courts have no constitutional power. 
Another injunction the courts consider themselves not empowered to issue 
concerns the order to Parliament (or indeed any other legislator) to produce 
legislation where the inconsistency with higher law is a question of legislative 
omission rather than an express act.123 In its landmark judgment on this matter, the 
Supreme Court explicitly ruled that it could not issue such an order, even though 
the omission rendered the legislation incompatible with EC law and therefore 
unlawful.124 The Court ruled that the question whether the State should meet its 
international obligations and, if so, in what manner – was a political decision for 
Parliament. Furthermore, the question whether there ought to be legislation and, if 
so, what should be its content equally was a political matter on which the courts 
should have nothing to say.125 There is a curious paradox here, because on the one 
hand, the Supreme Court considers itself incompetent to order the legislature to 
enact or withdraw legislation because that would be a political matter, but on the 
other hand considers itself, as a matter of last resort, empowered to carry out its 
lawmaking duty to the extent that it issues positive legislation.126 Moreover, the 
Court has had no objection against warning the legislature that it might in the 
future carry out this duty if Parliament stayed inactive for too long a period. 
However, according to the Court, there is a clear difference between on the one 
hand setting aside a statute (and extensively interpreting it) and an order to 
Parliament to the effect that it should produce legislation. The difference is that the 
latter has a generally binding effect because the future legislation will of course 
have such an effect, whereas the effects of both setting aside the statute and 
interpreting it are, at least on a formal basis, limited to the parties at hand. 
5.4. Effects of Judgments 
We will now describe briefly the effects court decisions regarding the interpretation 
of statutory law usually have. Such effects may have two dimensions. The first 
dimension concerns their binding nature. Do judgments of the courts, those of the 
Supreme Court in particular, bind the legislature, the government and other courts? 
We will deal here mainly with the distinction between effects erga omnes and inter 
partes, and the concept of res judicata in Dutch law. The second dimension relates to 
the temporal effects of courts decisions. We will outline those effects in the next 
section and while we are at it, try to give some impression of how the Supreme 
Court tries to mitigate the more far-reaching consequences of its judgments. 
 
122 Supreme Court judgment of 1 October 2004, NJ 2004/679 (Fauna-protection v. Province of 
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123 Supreme Court judgment of 21 March 2003, NJ 2003/691 (the State v. Waterpakt). 
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The first question is whether Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
lawfulness and the interpretation of statutory law in the light of fundamental rights 
have general (‘erga omnes’) effects. The simple answer is: they do not. First of all, the 
judicial system contains several columns which are not necessarily hierarchically 
subordinate to each other. The lack of any constitutional court having ultimate 
authority in that respect is clearly felt here. Moreover, as we have already outlined, 
the Dutch court system does not include a rule of judicial precedent.127 This means 
that the decisions of any court, including the Supreme Court, theoretically bind only 
the parties before it. Even within the ordinary judiciary, there is no formal 
obligation to follow Supreme Court precedents.128 On the other hand, as we have 
also remarked earlier, the practical effects of court decisions are not as meagre as 
they look at first sight, quite the contrary in fact. In the interests of equality and 
legal certainty, the courts generally observe each other’s decisions, particularly 
within the column of the ordinary courts where the lower courts are in fact bound 
by judgments of the Supreme Court. Even the administrative courts and the 
Supreme Court usually try to respect each other’s judgments, be it on a voluntary 
basis. There is then a relatively strong general effect. It has recently been argued 
that the Supreme Court has established this substantive approach in a judge-made 
rule, partly by using its doctrine on res judicata.129 
To start with, the Court may of course reverse the decisions of the lower courts 
in its own columns, viz. the civil, criminal and tax divisions. If those courts do not 
observe the judgments of the Supreme Court, it will regularly make use of its power 
to do so. Problems arise primarily with respect to administrative law. Neither the 
Supreme Court nor the highest administrative courts exercises any true jurisdiction 
over each other. Neither is therefore forced to follow any case law of the other. In a 
series of judgments in 2004 and 2005, however, the Supreme Court considered itself 
bound by a ruling of the highest administrative courts to the extent that such a 
ruling determines the inapplicability of a legislative provision because of its 
inconsistency with higher law130 It did not matter whether the parties before the 
Supreme Court had been involved in the administrative procedure. Third parties 
were equally bound to this ruling of the administrative courts. Things may be 
different if the administrative court decides to declare the legislative provision 
consistent with higher law. In that case third parties – which had not been litigating 
in the administrative procedure – would not be bound to that ruling in the sense 
that they are allowed to bring an action in the civil court system.131  
The question remains, of course, whether there is a similar rule compelling the 
administrative courts to give effect to the judgments of the Supreme Court. 
Although pleaded for by some scholars, there has not yet been any case law in that 
 
127 Supra note 51. Moreover, in Dutch: Bovend’Eert 2006, p. 157-177. 
128 See Schutgens 2009, p. 221. 
129 Ibid., p. 222. 
130 Supreme Court judgments of 18 February 2005, NJ 2005/283 (Aujeszky), and 11 October 2005, 
NJB 2005, p. 2106-2107 (Territorial order Nijmegen). See Schutgens 2009, p. 222-235 as well. 
131 Supreme Court judgment of 17 December 2004, NJ 2005/152 (OZB v. the State). 
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direction.132 However, one might argue that Supreme Court judgments generally 
bind the organs of the legal entity that is party to the proceedings. If the complaint 
about the unlawfulness of a legislative Act is brought forward in a direct action 
against the State, any organ of the state – including the administrative courts – 
should consider itself bound by a ruling of the Court. This argument does not 
apply, however, to the many cases in which a complaint against a statutory 
provision occurs indirectly in the course of proceedings before the ordinary courts. 
On the other hand, as we have said before, the administrative courts usually try to 
observe the rulings of the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether they consider 
themselves bound to them. It is therefore to be expected that they will comply with 
a ruling concerning the unlawfulness of legislation. 
5.5. Mitigating the Temporal Effects of Judgments 
The other dimension concerns the temporal effects of Supreme Court judgments. 
Such judgments usually have retrospective effect in the sense that the courts have 
traditionally always assumed that any interpretation regarding the law they might 
arrive at is part of the law itself.133 In this, rather old-fashioned, view, it is not the 
court shaping the law but rather the court ‘finding’ the correct interpretation of the 
law as rightfully intended by the legislature.134 The Supreme Court was never very 
clear, however, about the classic temporal effects of its judgments. In the older case 
law it just implicitly assumed that its new interpretation had retrospective effect.135 
As we have showed in the previous section the Court’s view of its own role as well 
as that of legal scholarship has changed over the years and from the 1970s onward, 
the Court has increasingly become more willing to mitigate the temporal effects of 
its judgments.136 As the Court embraced a lawmaking duty, it became possible to 
openly discuss the consequences of judicial overruling. The last few decades have 
therefore showed some examples of judicial prospective overruling. Legal literature 
distinguishes both ‘true’ prospective overruling and ‘qualified’ prospective 
overruling.137 One may speak of the true variant if the Court does not apply its new 
interpretation in the case at hand but rather postpones it to some time in the future. 
One uses the term ‘qualified’ prospective overruling when the Court immediately 
applies its new interpretation or rule, but limits the possibilities for other parties 
than those in the case at hand, to appeal to the new rule. An example of the latter 
provides the 1981 Boon v. Van Loon judgment, where the Court changed its case law 
on the ownership of pensions in divorce law.138 Here the Court explicitly limited the 
 
132 See, for instance, Schutgens 2009, p. 234. 
133 See Supreme Court judgment of 22 June 1883, W 4924 (Jansen v. Heiting). See moreover: 
Scholten 1974, p. 137. 
134 See Polak 1984, p. 229-230. For criminal law, see Rozemond 1998, p. 246-268. 
135 See the Jansen v. Heiting case mentioned in footnote 133. 
136 For a historical overview of the changing attitude of the Court, see Polak 1984, p. 231-244. 
137 Polak 1984. 
138 Supreme Court judgment of 27 November 1981, NJ 1982/503 (Boon v. Van Loon). 
THE DUTCH SUPREME COURT: A RELUCTANT POSITIVE LEGISLATOR? 
34 
temporal effect of its new course to the case at hand and future cases. Where the 
divorce had already been pronounced, no appeal to the new rule would be possible. 
As a clear example of the first option (‘true’ prospective overruling) might 
serve the classic case law concerning the Labour expenses deduction, we have 
elaborately discussed in the previous section.139 Here, the Court ruled that it would 
not – for the time being – intervene because doing so would entail choosing from 
different policy options. But it made it clear that it might think otherwise if the 
legislature knowingly persisted in its unlawful course. It remained therefore open 
for the Court to overrule its 1999 judgment in the future on the basis that it had 
informed Parliament of the unlawful nature of the provision in question. In the 
follow-up of this case, it moreover explicitly ruled that Parliament was not obliged 
to add retroactive effect to its subsequent amendments of the impugned Income Tax 
Act.140 This judgment also shows, however, that the Court is usually not prepared to 
fix a certain date before which the existing legislation should be amended. As far as 
we know, the Court has not yet done so anyway.141 
A mixture of both options can be found in a similar decision of the Supreme 
Court in a case in which it ruled that the policy to exclude ministers’ official cars 
from Income Tax violated the principle of equal treatment.142 However, it 
temporarily limited the possibilities of third parties to invoke the case in their own 
dealings with the tax authorities. It ruled that, as long as the unequal treatment 
concerned a small privileged group and the government was unaware of the legal 
principle at stake, it would not allow complaints as long as it could be said that the 
tax inspector was unaware that he was treating taxpayers unequally. The Court 
effectively said that the government should immediately quit the impugned 
practice, but refused to accept the argument for the sake of the claimants in the case 
at hand. 
These examples show that, the Court occasionally eases some of the ‘pain’ of 
extensively interpreting or setting aside a statute by prospective overruling. It has 
even explicitly recognised so in a recommendation it made to the government in 
1991 on questions about lifting the ban on judicial constitutional review by 
amending Article 120 of the Constitution.143 It effectively pleaded for such an 
amendment and argued that the fear for infringements on the principle of legal 
certainty might be dispelled by pointing at the possible ways of mitigating 
judgments which could pose a threat to legal certainty.  
 
139 Supra note 79. 
140 Supreme Court judgment of 14 June 2002, BNB 2002/289 (Labour expenses  deduction II). 
141 None of the other courts has ever fixed a specific date, but one of the three highest 
administrative courts, the Central Court of Appeal in social security matters did 
retrospectively consider once that time was up as it overruled an earlier judgment to 
effectively give the government some time. See, for example, its judgment of 7 December 
1988, AB 1989/10 (General Widows and Orphans Act).  
142 Supreme Court judgment of 5 February 1997, BNB 1997/160 (Ministers’ official cars). 
143 The recommendation of 31 October 1991 was published in NJCM Bulletin 1992, p. 243-259. 
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5.6. Judicial Reforms 
In a recent report by members of the Supreme Court itself, concerns were expressed 
about the way in which the Court was forced to carry out its lawmaking duty.144 
First of all, the commission responsible for the report emphasized the crucial role 
the Supreme Court had to play in the administration of justice and the development 
and, consequently, the creation of the law. It argued that the Court is currently 
flooded with cases that, from the perspectives of either legal protection of citizens or 
the development of the law, were of little importance. More importantly, however, 
the commission also drew attention to the fact that the Court was partly unable to 
fulfil its lawmaking duties because important cases might not necessarily reach the 
court or, if they do, reach it only after a lengthy period of time. The commission 
suggested two remedies. First of all, it pointed to an already existing instrument, 
which it thought would be worth using more extensively, which concerns ‘cassation 
in the interest of the law’ (cassatie in het belang der wet). The Procurator General at the 
Supreme Court may, under Article 78(6) of the Judicial Organisation Act, appeal to 
the Supreme Court on behalf of the government where both parties in the case are 
unable to do so and he is of the opinion that there is a need for a clear judgment by 
the Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court in such a case cannot affect the legal 
position of both parties in the case at hand, but it can provide clarity. Second, the 
commission pleaded for experimenting with a limited preliminary question 
procedure. This would allow a relatively speedy clarification of legal issues where 
there is massive uncertainty among the courts and the legal profession. Meanwhile, 
the Minister for Justice has expressed his endorsement of the proposals and has 
announced plans to establish a limited preliminary procedure in cases of mass 
claims.145 It remains to be seen how this development will affect the lawmaking role 
of the Supreme Court in due time. The reforms envisaged show however that both 
the Supreme Court itself and the responsible cabinet ministers openly acknowledge 
the positive lawmaking role of the Supreme Court. 
6. Summary 
In the introduction to this contribution we promised to briefly summarize our 
findings thereby attending to the questions posed by the general reporter. In the 
course of our analyses we touched upon three main themes. As a preliminary point 
of order we gave a brief account of how fundamental rights review takes place in 
the Dutch legal system. The Constitution contains a bill of rights but it also bans the 
courts from reviewing parliamentary legislation on the basis of the Constitution. 
Fundamental rights review thus mainly takes place on the basis of international 
human rights law. 
 
144 This is the Hammerstein report: Versterking van de cassatierechtspraak (‘Strengthening 
Cassation’), The Hague,2008. 
145 Parliamentary Reports of the Second Chamber 2007/2008, 29 279, No. 69. 
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With regard to the judicial means for judicial review, it should be emphasized 
from the outset that the Netherlands does not have a specialized constitutional 
court. Fundamental rights review is both highly dispersed and general in the sense 
that any court is empowered to review Acts of Parliament for their consistency with 
self-executing provisions of treaty law in the course of general statutory 
interpretation. This means that there are no specific constitutional complaints 
available to victims of fundamental rights violations, such as the recurso de ampáro. 
Constitutional issues may be raised in any kind of judicial procedure but it should 
of course be noted that Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution prohibits the courts 
from reviewing the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation. With regard to 
violations of either the Constitution or any other provision containing fundamental 
rights, victims of violations may file a regular complaint in the civil courts on the 
basis of a general tort (Article 6:162 of the Civil Code). Consequently, no specific 
civil rights injunctions exist. Civil remedies typically include the award of damages 
and a formal declaration of the unlawful nature concerning the enactment or 
application of the statute in question. When courts consider a particular remedy 
outside the scope of their respective lawmaking duty, they may also issue a 
declaration to the extent that the statute in question is inconsistent with a 
fundamental right or liberty and leave it at that (besides awarding the victim the 
costs of the proceedings). Such declarations have no binding effect on the 
government, except when the State is party to the case at hand. However, the 
government generally recognizes the authority of the highest courts in legal matters 
and thus considers itself under a moral obligation to change the law. Although the 
courts may appeal to the legislature to enact legislation, they do not have any power 
to order either the government or the legislature to do so. 
As a point of reference, we have chosen to offer an account of the role of the 
Supreme Court. The members of the Court do not have any ex officio powers, nor 
does the Court have an express power to remove and take over cases from lower 
courts or tribunals. As we have seen, however, the Procurator General at the 
Supreme Court does have the power to institute proceedings at the Supreme Court 
if a case is decided by lower courts and the parties are no longer in a position to 
appeal to the Supreme Court. Debates on the lawmaking duties and powers of the 
Court have resulted in proposals for a more ambitious use of this instrument. Such 
proposals have moreover resulted in an experiment to establish a preliminary 
question procedure in a limited number of cases in order to centralise and quicken 
the process of judicial lawmaking in the interest of uniformity and legal certainty. 
We have furthermore elaborated on the Supreme Courts case law on judicial 
review and judicial lawmaking. As we have observed, the Court may, on the basis 
of Article 94 of the Constitution (or on the basis of EU law) set aside statutory 
provisions. Annulment is, at least theoretically, not possible as the Court’s decisions 
bind only the parties of the case. However courts are allowed to declare the 
inconsistent nature of statutes and such declarations issued by the Supreme Court 
come very close to an annulment in practice. Our account particularly showed that 
the Court is usually prepared to provide victims of human rights violations redress 
if such redress means setting aside the statute. Using its interpretative authority to 
alter and reform legislation is entirely another matter. Although the Court considers 
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itself competent to play a modest lawmaking role, it is prepared to play that role 
only where it is not required to engage in political decision-making. This means that 
it will fill a legal gap on the basis of international human rights law only if there is 
just one legitimate outcome of the case, or if a specific outcome fits neatly in the 
existing statutory scheme. If these requirements are not met, the Court will abstain 
both from judicial lawmaking and accepting the claim. However, it does consider 
itself competent to overrule such a demonstration of restraint if it believes the 
legislature to be negligent. It thus only abstains for the time being. 
This connects closely with our last point, concerning the effects of judicial 
decisions of the Supreme Court. As we have observed, the Court’s philosophy – 
from a purely theoretical standpoint – has always been that its case law is not a 
formal source of law. It binds only the parties before it. In practice, however, the 
judgments of the Court clearly have a binding nature, at the very least for the lower 
courts in its judicial columns (taxation, criminal and civil law). Again, on a purely 
formal basis, the judgments of the Court have only ex tunc or retrospective effects. 
This follows from the Court’s traditional approach that it ‘finds’, rather than creates, 
the law. However, in recent times the Court has adopted a more flexible view by 
using its practice to abstain in certain cases in order to provide the legislature with a 
limited period of time to remedy a particular violation. Some authors have attached 
the label of prospective overruling to this approach. However, the Court’s practice 
still shows that it is very reluctant to really enforce such a conditional overruling. 
Furthermore, the Labour expenses deduction case shows that the Court does not 
consider it necessary for the legislature to regulate the retroactive effects of a 
judicially declared violation. 
The general impression the Dutch Supreme Court gives is that of a very 
prudent Court, exercising considerable restraint, at least when it comes to the 
question of remedies. It should be noted, however, that the Court does leave open 
the possibility of judicial lawmaking if it deems it necessary for an effective 
protection of fundamental rights. Moreover, the case law concerning fundamental 
rights and judicial lawmaking shows for a large part that the legislature usually 
pays a great deal of respect to fundamental rights. Most cases reaching the Court 
concern relatively minor breaches of fundamental rights provisions. The restraint 
the Court shows may therefore be considered to be somewhat justified. Apparently, 
the Dutch legislative process includes some mechanisms to ensure a reasonable 
degree of consistency, at least with internationally accepted human rights norms. 
Such mechanisms are certainly worth looking into. But that’s another story.  
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